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Summary
In this thesis I present a model featuring sovereign default in equilibrium. The government
can choose a default rate between zero and one and the ownership structure of the debt
matters for the decision. My main motivation is to propose an explanation of why the
share of sovereign debt held by foreign investors has decreased in most countries in the
European Monetary Union (EMU) since the beginning of the financial crisis. In the model
decreasing foreign share is a rational response of expected utility maximizing investors
when faced with increased risk of default. The model is also able to explain the negative
correlation between bond yields and foreign share of bondholders found in the data. The
empirical motivation for the thesis is the events in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and
Spain (PIIGS), as those are the countries most affected by the crisis. From 2007 to 2011
the average foreign share of debt holdings in those countries decreased by 11 percentage
points. The PIIGS countries also experienced the largest increases in interest rates on
their sovereign debt. In light of the low and stable bond yields and increasing shares of
foreign bond holders that characterized the beginning of the millennium, this is a dramatic
change and an interesting topic for research.
Sovereign debt makes up almost one fifth of the world’s financial assets and has become
an important interest rate benchmark and investment option. Before the financial crisis
the trade of European sovereign debt across boarders increased, probably because of
increased financial integration. Government debt obligations issued by advanced countries
were viewed as a safe investment and credit ratings were strong. A lot has changed since
2007. European sovereign debt markets have been in turmoil for most of the time between
2008 and 2014. Yield spreads have been huge for many countries and credit ratings are
poor. Debt obligations have changed hands at a rapid rate and are increasingly sold back
to investors in the issuing country. It is this last development that is the main focus of
my thesis. Little is known about the determinants of - and impact on - the ownership
structure of sovereign debt. Some new empirical work show some facts and trends, but
little theoretical work has been done on the subject.
I suggest that the reduction in the share of foreign investors holding sovereign debt
is a rational response to sovereign risk. The reduction is analyzed as a home bias in
sovereign bonds only present when there is risk of default. Much of the home bias literature
introduces trade costs or other market frictions to explain observations in the data. My
home bias mechanism is not dependent on market failure or frictions, but is only applicable
on sovereign debt. I build my model following a long tradition of modeling sovereign debt
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as a non-enforceable asset with penalties for defaulting. My model differs from the main
literature in that it focuses on the ownership structure of the bonds. It also allows for
partial default, where most models focus on the binary choice of default or full repayment.
The model contains foreign and domestic investors in addition to a domestic govern-
ment that issues debt. The home and foreign investors act as expected utility maximizers.
All agents live for two periods and the second period income for the home investor is uncer-
tain. The government’s debt is not enforceable and creditors risk default in equilibrium.
The interest rate on government bonds is determined in the market and depends on ex-
pectations about government behavior. Debt is repaid with tax revenue in the second
period and the government chooses the default rate by maximizing the utility of their
population. Domestic investors incur a loss if the government chooses to default, the
size of the loss depends on the default rate and the realization income. The decision is
thus a trade-of between tax-gains and default-penalties. My analysis consists of varying
the risk level by changing the income distribution and debt level and then comparing
the results. Increased risk leads to higher interest rates and lower share of foreign bond
holdings. Specifically I find that decreased expected GDP or increased debt has about
the same effect. Both increase interest rates and decrease the foreign share by about the
same magnitude. Increased probability of recession on the other hand has a much larger
effect on interest rates and less effect on the foreign share than the first two.
The mechanism at work is related to the government’s default decision. The govern-
ment finances repayment of the bond by taxing their inhabitants. Domestic investors
observe that they get a lower tax in case of default and is thus partly "insured" against
default risk. This effect is increasing in the risk level and induces domestic investors to
take advantage of the increased interest rate to buy more of the bond. Foreign investors
have income that is uncorrelated with the return on sovereign debt and thus only care
about expected return and the risk level. The decline in foreign bond holdings is thus
a result of increased risk. Following directly from this is also the proposal that there is
no causal relationship between yields and the foreign share, both have a common driver;
the default risk. I also propose mechanisms that might have contributed to the outbreak
of the sovereign debt crisis. The model can describe a situation with multiple equilibria
where the good, low risk, equilibrium is fragile both to expectations and the share of for-
eign bond holders. Expectations of default could increase interest rates and make default
optimal for the government. Similarly, an increase in foreign bond holders makes default
more likely, because the government only cares about domestic investors.
Solution of the model and the analysis is carried out in Matlab.
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1 Introduction
Recent data by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012b) indicate that the share of sovereign debt
held by foreign investors in several European countries has been falling since the financial
crisis in 2007. In this thesis I propose that the decrease in the foreign share of bond
holdings is the result of increased default risk. I analyze a rational expectations model
with the possibility of sovereign default in equilibrium and find that the decrease could
be viewed as a rational response to default risk. I solve this model by the fsolve function
in Matlab. The government finances repayment of their outstanding debt by taxing their
inhabitants. Domestic investors are thus partly insured against default as default leads
to a lower tax burden. They exploit this to increase their holdings of sovereign debt when
risk increases. The model also enables me to answer the question of why there is a strong
negative correlation between sovereign bond yields and foreign share of bond holdings
by proposing that default risk causes both high yields and low foreign share. Sovereign
debt has not been studied much in the literature on asset ownership and home bias in
the past. Sovereign debt is a large and important asset class in international financial
markets. Tomz and Wright (2013) estimate that in 2010 sovereign debt made up about
19% of global financial assets. This, combined with the fact that not even the debt of
advanced countries debt can be trusted as risk free, makes the study of this asset class
a hot topic for research and I hope this thesis can contribute to the understanding of
sovereign debt.
2 Background
The inspiration for the project comes from events in European sovereign debt markets
during and after the financial crisis. The Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings
developed in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012b) brings forth an interesting topic, namely
the role of the ownership structure of sovereign debt. The dataset contains information
on the ownership of the sovereign debt of 10 countries in the European Monetary Union
(EMU) and additionally the USA and UK. Data for all the EMU countries is available
for 2002-2012, In the data presented later I drop the last year because of a break in
the Greek series. It decomposes debt by ownership in several domestic and one foreign
category. This kind of dataset is new and reveals several interesting topics of research,
notably the question why sovereign debt ownership has changed in later years. A similar
dataset was developed by Andritzky (2012), which includes fewer EMU countries, but
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also includes data for other G20 countries. The main features presented are similar in the
two datasets.
A secondary source of interest is the negative correlation between bond yields and the
share of foreign investors holding the debt. Andritzky (2012) establishes the relationship
between 10 year government bond yields and the share of foreign holdings. He finds
a strong negative correlation between government bond yields and the share of foreign
holders. He suggests that it is the low and stable yields that attract foreign investors, but
is unable to conclude.
2.1 European sovereign debt
The main empirical focus in this thesis is on European sovereign debt. In the next
subsections I present an overview of previous and current bond yields and the ownership
structure of European government debt in later years. I focus on recent trends and
shifts in those trends around two specific events; the introduction of the euro and the
recent financial crisis. The trends are apparent for most EMU-countries, but strongest in
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIIGS). The PIIGS countries experienced the
highest interest rates and the biggest shifts in the ownership structure of government debt.
The model I present later on propose explanations for those shifts and will be discussed
in relation to the PIIGS countries in section 6. The background given here serves both as
motivation for studying sovereign debt ownership and as a reference for later discussion
and comparison to the model.
2.1.1 1999-2007
The introduction of the euro in 1999 had major effects on the involved countries. Faruqee
(2004) estimates a 10% increase in trade between member countries in the first three
years. Lane (2006) show that trade has increased both within the euro-zone and between
EMU-members and the rest of the world. There is also much evidence in support of the
euro boosting foreign direct investment and the trade of financial assets across borders.
One example of this is found in Lane (2006), where he investigates the share of European
countries international portfolio holdings allocated to Euro-zone partners and show in-
creases in the share held by Eurozone-partners for almost all countries. Sovereign bonds
was flowing across national borders and every country in the Bruegel dataset experience
an increase in the share of foreign holdings of their sovereign debt from the introduction
of the euro in January 1999 and well in to the new decade. On average we see foreign
2
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Figure 1: 10 year European bond yields 1993-2013
holdings increase from 1999 to 2007 by around 26 percentage points in the ten countries
in the dataset while the median 22 percentage points1. The data is presented in table 1.
Andritzky (2012) argues that the increased financial integration and regulatory changes
fueled the large increases in foreign holdings of sovereign debt.
The interest rates in the EMU have followed an interesting pattern in later years. In
figure 1 I plot interest rates on long term sovereign bonds for the same countries discussed
above. With the introduction of the single currency exchange rate risk was eliminated
between EMU-countries. Following this reduction in risk it was expected that interest
rates would converge, and they did. The period was also characterized by an unprece-
dented stability of these rates. From 1999 and throughout 2007 the interest rates hardly
moved outside the 4-5 % range as seen in figure 1. Cappiello et al. (2006) confirm the
convergence in yields by showing that correlation coefficients between European sovereign
bonds rose to almost 1 after the introduction of the monetary union and the euro.
1For these and later calculations I have used non-weighted averages and inserted most recent (2001,2000
and 2005) data for the countries without 1999 data.
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Country\Year 1999 2007 2011
Greece 31.6% 73.8% 59.2%
Ireland 56.9%* 93.1 % 77.9%
Portugal 54.2%* 75.8% 67.0 %
Italy 29.9% 49.1 % 45.0 %
Spain 28.8% 47.7% 36.2%
Germany 34.4% 49.5% 55.8%
France 13.0% 55.0% 57.0%
Netherlands 65.9%* 69.5 % 64.1 %
Belgium 29.8% 59.7% 48.6%
Finland 49.5% 84.9% 88.9%
Table 1: Non-resident holdings of Sovereign debt. *Values from 1999 not available, the displayed
numbers are from 2001, 2000 and 2005 respectively.
2.1.2 2007-2011
The most interesting trend shifts happened with the financial unrest in 2007 and the
breakdown that followed in 2008. As seen in table 1 the share of foreign holdings of
sovereign debt fell in most countries from 2007 to 2011. On average the share dropped
just short of 6 percentage points and the median drop was around 7 percentage points. The
only countries with increasing foreign share were Germany, France and Finland, but the
increases were small. Looking at the most troubled economies, PIIGS, both the average
and median drop in foreign share was 11 percentage points. We observe that the same
countries experiencing the largest drop in the foreign share also had the largest increases
in interest rates and the only countries with growing shares had low and stable rates.
More formal evidence on the trend-break is presented in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012a)
who use a sudden stop approach in identifying episodes of large decreases in the inflow of
foreign capital. They identify several such episodes for all the PIIGS countries from 2007
to 2011. The previously low bond yield differentials also changed dramatically. Yields in
the stable countries, namely Germany, Netherlands, France and Belgium fell and interest
rates in the PIIGS countries rose. The effect seen in figure 1 is dramatic. While many,
e.g. Attinasi et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009) and De Santis (2012), have proposed
different explanations for the high yield differentials the question of why the foreign share
fell remains largely unanswered. In this thesis I propose a possible mechanism.
4
Country Correlation
Portugal -0.44
Italy -0.28
Ireland -0.04
Greece 0.09
Spain -0.63
Table 2: Correlation between interest rates and foreign shares of debt holdings in the PIIGS-
countries between 2002 and 2011.
2.2 Investor base and Yields
Andritzky (2012) conclude that there is a strong and robust association between lower
yields and larger shares of non-resident holdings of government bonds. Using the same
data as in figure 1 and table 1 I calculate the correlation between interest rates and the
foreign share on data from 2002 to 20112 for the PIIGS-countries. I find similar results for
the PIIGS countries as the conclusion from Andritzky. The results are displayed in table
2. Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain all have negative correlation coefficients between
interest rates and foreign share between January 2002 and December 2011. Greece has
the only positive coefficient of 0.09. This is because there is a break in the trends around
2007, if we split the series in two parts we get coefficients of -0.39 for 2002-2006 and -0.97
for 2007-2011. The same pattern is apparent also for the other PIIGS-countries.
Andritzky (2012) examines which way the causation goes between them. He finds
some evidence for the argument that low yields attract foreign investors, but remains
hesitant to conclude. In this thesis I argue that there is no clear causation, but rather
that they are both caused by a common factor, the risk of default.
3 Literature review
This thesis argues that the outflow of foreign investors from many European countries
over the last years is the result of a rational home bias only present when there is default
risk present. While I find few references on home bias in sovereign debt in the literature,
there are some topics that are connected. I find it useful to examine other views on home
2I use monthly data for interest rates. For the foreign share I have quarterly data, except for Portugal
where the data is annual.
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bias in the literature, keeping in mind that most of those are written on equities or bonds
in general. My model also builds on a tradition on how to model sovereign debt, so a
short review of the sovereign debt literature is also included.
3.1 Home bias
Home bias in assets have been a hot topic for research since French and Poterba (1991)
documented the inefficiently low levels of diversification and Tesar and Werner (1995)
showed a significant home bias and high turnover in equity holdings. The fact that
investors worldwide seem to prefer investments at home over better hedging opportunities
abroad has fascinated economists for some time. In their widely cited paper The Six Major
Puzzles in International Macroeconomics Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) list home bias in
portfolios as one of their six puzzles. In their paper Tesar and Werner pointed to tax
wedges or transaction costs as possible explanations of the home bias before proceeding
to exclude transaction costs as a possible explanation due to the high turnover rate. Their
results have later been revisited, notably by Warnock (2002) who rejects their results that
the turnover is higher on foreign assets than domestic assets. Warnock does, however,
confirm the result that transaction costs are not the cause of the observed home bias.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) offer the explanation that home bias is partly explained
by trade costs, not in assets, but in consumption goods, a view later rejected by, among
others, Coeurdacier (2009). Another explanation of the home bias puzzle is information
asymmetries and investment advantages. When domestic investors have informational
advantages in their home market, their portfolios should be skewed towards domestic
assets. A quite recent contribution into this strand of the literature is Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2009). The importance of international diversification for hedging against
fluctuations in income from human capital was raised by Baxter et al. (1998). The idea
being that returns on domestic assets are closely correlated with wages. This meant the
home bias puzzle was even more severe than what was believed earlier. This argument
was turned around by Heathcote and Perri (2013), building on empirical results from
Julliard (2003). Heathcote and Perri argue that investing in domestic assets could be a
good hedge against labor income fluctuations. The arguments focusing on diversification
for consumption smoothing are the ones most in line with the argument in my thesis as I
argue that government debt might be a good hedge against tax fluctuations at home for
domestic investors.
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3.2 Sovereign debt
Modeling sovereign debt as a contract with limited enforcement is a tradition that goes
back to Debt with Potential Repudiation by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). A central
element in the modeling of sovereign debt is that governments cannot commit to repay
their debt and a mechanism is needed to keep them from defaulting each period. In their
paper Eaton and Gersovitz model a world where governments are excluded from bond
markets if they default. The mechanism has been modeled in different ways, such as ad
hoc default penalties, endogenous penalties and market exclusion. A recent review on
the literature on sovereign debt can be found in Aguiar and Amador (2013). My model
consists of only two periods, so I model the penalty of default as cash penalties more
along the lines of Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Niepelt and Dellas (2013).
In a recent paper Niepelt and Dellas (2013) model a situation where the composition
of creditors matters for the default choice. They arrive at a model where official lending
by institutions like the IMF or governments discipline the indebted government because
they have greater means to penalize a defaulting government. In this paper I model a
similar environment where the composition of foreign versus domestic creditors matter for
the default decision. I do not require asymmetries in the ability to penalize, but exploit
the assumption that governments care about the welfare of the population. My model
is simpler in many ways, but goes further in modeling the default decision. Rather than
focusing only on the binary choice between full repayment and full default I allow for
partial default and model the continuous choice of default rate.
4 The model
4.1 Model environment
The model consists of a home country and the rest of the world and ends after two
periods. The home country is inhabited by many investors that consume in both periods
and make investment decisions in the first period to save for the second. They choose
to save in domestic government bonds or in the world market. The rest of the world
is inhabited by a group of investors with access to the market for government debt in
addition many other agents without access to the market for sovereign debt. Both the
home investors and foreign investors with access to the sovereign debt market are small
groups compared to the rest of the world. The preferences of all agents can be represented
by a utility function satisfying Gorman’s aggregation theorem (Gorman, 1953), so both
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investor groups can be represented by a representative agent. The size of the population
is the same in both periods. The Home country also has a government that finances
public expenditure by taxation and debt. The foreign government is passive and only
supply government provisions by lump sum tax. There are international markets for both
the consumption good and financial assets. Prices on consumption goods are assumed
constant and all interest rates are denoted in terms of the consumption good.
4.1.1 Timing
In the first period agents, both home and foreign, make their consumption and investment
decisions based on their expectations about the second period. The interest rate on
sovereign bonds is determined in the market for sovereign debt. This market is supplied
by an exogenous amount of zero coupon debt obligations B, which correspond to the home
governments’ financing needs. The investors can perfectly predict how the government will
act in all possible scenarios in period two, but as the world is inhabited by many agents
their individual impact on the decisions made are negligible. All income is exogenous and
there are no stochastic elements in the first period. At the beginning of the second period
the outcome of the stochastic endowment is drawn. The government observes the realized
endowment and chooses its tax and default rate. Agents receive their income and debt
repayment, pay their taxes, consume and die.
4.1.2 Income and budget constraints
At the beginning of the first period both investors have a given wealth. Investors total
wealth consists of all assets held in addition to their period one income less taxes payed
in period one. Wealth is denoted I1 for the Home investor and I∗1 for the Foreign investor.
This wealth is used for consumption in period one and investment in sovereign debt at
interest rate r. Both investor groups are assumed to be wealthy enough to hold the entire
amount of debt if they spend their entire wealth, I1 > B and I∗1 > B. Agents are also able
to lend or borrow at the world market with an exogenous interest rate rR. This market
coordinates the supply and demand of the rest of the world’s inhabitants. Government
bonds bought by home investors are denoted a and their position in the risk free asset
is denoted aR, conversely foreign investors holdings are denoted a∗ and a∗R. Their period
one budget constraint is thus given by (1) for the home investor and (2) for the foreign.
c1 + a+ aR = I1 (1)
c∗1 + a
∗ + a∗R = I
∗
1 (2)
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In the second period, consumption is determined by the return on what agents saved
from the first period in addition to a new endowment yi for the home investor and y∗ for
the foreign. The second period endowment, interpreted as GDP, at home is uncertain and
has a discrete distribution with the probability density function (PDF) f(yi) = P (y = yi),
n∑
i=1
f(yi) = 1 for n possible realizations. The return on the government bond will also
depend on the realization of yi through the actions of the home government. The second
period budget constraint for each state of the world is described in (3) for home and (4)
for foreign. Consumption is denoted c with the subscript denoting period 1 and 2, asterisk
superscript denotes foreign consumption. The default rate for state i is denoted di and τ i
is the tax rate. L(di, yi) denotes the loss incurred by the home investor if it’s government
defaults in state i and is explained below.
ci2 = y
i − τ i + (1− di)(1 + r)a+ (1 + rR)aR − L(di, yi) (3)
c∗,i2 = y
∗ − τ ∗ + (1− di)(1 + r)a∗ + (1 + rR)a∗R (4)
4.1.3 Preferences
The representative agents home and abroad are assumed to be identical. They only care
about consumption. Public provisions are assumed not to affect agents’ utility and are
left out of the model. The representative agents discount the second period by β and we
assume 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. In making decisions agents maximize expected utility over the two
periods, solving problem (5) and (6).
max
c1,a,aR
U = E[u(c1) + βu(c
i
2)]
st. (1) and (3)
(5)
max
c∗1,a∗,a
∗
R
U∗ = E[u(c∗1) + βu(c
∗,i
2 )]
st. (2) and (4)
(6)
4.1.4 Markets
There are three markets in this economy but only two is determined within the model.
The world market for assets has an interest rate determined outside the model and need no
market clearing condition. In (7) we impose market clearing in the market for government
bonds and the market for consumption goods will clear by Walras’ law.
B = a+ a∗ (7)
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4.1.5 Loss in case of default
The model is partly built on the tradition of debt with potential repudiation following
Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981) seminal paper. The government may default on all, or a part
of, its debt. To keep the government from doing so consistently creditors must have some
means to punish the government if they default. I assume that the creditors are able to
inflict a cost on the home country if the government chooses default. In this model the loss
in case of default is taken by the inhabitants of the home country, it hurts the government
indirectly as they care about the welfare of their citizens. The cost represents any penalty
or sanction imposed by the international community and is denoted by L(di, yi). The
specific loss function used here is specified in (8) and capture some key elements in the
model.
L(di, yi) =
{
0 if di = 0
k + hyi(di)2 if d > 0 k > 0, h > 0
(8)
First, there is a fixed cost, k, associated with default. This seems reasonable since the
signal effect of even a slight move away from full repayment would imply a large cost.
It would create big reactions in markets and also trigger credit default swaps and other
contracts. The fixed cost also makes the model applicable in a situation where both the
default rate and the binary choice of default versus no default can be endogenized. Second,
the loss depends positively on the rate of default and the realization of GDP. The positive
dependence on GDP is motivated by both the creditors’ opportunity and the creditors’
willingness to impose sanctions. Higher GDP potentially makes sanctions more painful
because you have more to lose. Creditors might also go easier on a country forced into
default by low GDP than a country choosing default even with high GDP. The positive
dependence on the square of di enables the model to incorporate partial default.
4.2 Government decision and default mechanism
The only risk factor investors face in the asset markets is that the home government
might not repay all of the debt. The government choose a default rate, di for each
state i. This yields a repayment rate of (1 − di), giving investors a gross return on the
bond of (1 + r)(1 − di). The outcome of di is chosen by the government after observing
the realized endowment. We assume that the government cannot discriminate between
home and foreign investors. This assumption can be viewed as an institutional constraint
based on very large penalties for default discrimination. The home government finance
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the repayment by taxing their inhabitants a lump sum τ i. The government’s budget
constraint in the second period is given by (9).
τ i = (1− di)(1 + r)B (9)
The government maximizes their inhabitants utility subject to this constraint by choosing
the default rate. The choice of d affect agents in tree ways; first default will reduce
the actual payoff to whoever holds the bonds, secondly default triggers a loss for the
inhabitants of the home country and thirdly it will imply a reduction in the tax-burden
of the home inhabitants.
In period two the agents consume their entire second period income. Since the gov-
ernment only affects their inhabitant’s income directly in the second period this means
that maximizing utility translates into maximizing second period total income. The gov-
ernment acts after yi is realized so the government solution will specify a default rate
corresponding to all possible outcomes of yi. The governments optimization problem for
each state i is specified in (10).
max
τ i,di
I i2 = y
i − τ i + (1− di)(1 + r)a+ (1 + rR)aR − L(di, yi)
st. τ i = (1− di)(1 + r)B
0 ≤ di ≤ 1
(10)
The solution to the problem would be a first order condition defining the interior solution,
di,d, given in (11), and endpoint conditions given in (12) and (13) where f denotes the
foreign share of bond holdings, f = a∗
B
.
di,d =
f(1 + r)B
2hyi
(11)
di = 0 if yi ≥ [f(1 + r)B]
2
4kh
(12)
di = 1 if di,d > 1 (13)
For every possible realization of yi this yields a default rate, di, and taxes,
τ i = (1− di)(1 + r)B.
4.3 Further specification of the model
To simplify my analysis I limit the possible outcomes of the second period endowment to
two values, yL or yH , and let p denote the probability of the low outcome, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
11
Superscript L denotes the bad realization and H the good, yL < yH . In this case the
households problems are represented by (14) and (15).
max
c1,a,aR
U = u(c1) + pβu(c
L
2 ) + (1− p)βu(cH2 )
st. (1) and (3)
(14)
max
c∗1,a∗,a
∗
R
U∗ = u(c∗1) + pβu(c
∗,L
2 ) + (1− p)βu(c∗,H2 )
st. (2) and (4)
(15)
The solutions are given by the first order conditions in (16) and (17) for the home investor
and in (18) and (19) for the foreign investor in addition to their budget constraints.
u′(c1) = (1− p)β(1 + r)u′(cH2 )(1− dH) + pβ(1 + r)(1− dL)u′(cL2 ) (16)
u′(c1) = (1− p)β(1 + rR)u′(cH2 ) + pβ(1 + rR)u′(cL2 ) (17)
u′(c∗1) = (1− p)β(1 + r)u′(c∗,H2 )(1− dH) + pβ(1 + r)(1− dL)u′(c∗,L2 ) (18)
u′(c∗1) = (1− p)β(1 + rR)u′(c∗,H2 ) + pβ(1 + rR)u′(c∗,L2 ) (19)
I also specify utility to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form, u(c) = c1−θ
1−θ
for θ 6= 1 and u(c) = log(c) for θ = 1, where θ can be interpreted as the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. First order conditions with CRRA utility are shown in (20) and
(21) for the home investor and in (22) and (23) for the foreign investor.
1
1 + r
= βc1
(
(1− p)(1− dH)
(cH2 )
θ
+
(1− p)(1− dL)
(cL2 )
θ
)
(20)
1
1 + rR
= βc1
(
1− p
(cH2 )
θ
+
p
(cL2 )
θ
)
(21)
1
1 + r
= βc∗1
(
(1− p)(1− dH)
(c∗,H2 )θ
+
p(1− dL)
(c∗,L2 )θ
)
(22)
1
1 + rR
= βc∗1
(
1− p
(c∗,H2 )θ
+
p
(c∗,L2 )θ
)
(23)
4.4 Equilibria
An equilibrium in this model are values of c1, c∗1, a, aR, a∗, a∗R, r, cH2 , cL2 , c
H,∗
2 , c
L,∗
2 and
di that satisfy equations (1), (2), (3)i=H , (3)i=L, (4)i=H , (4)i=L, (7), (20), (21), (22) and
(23) in addition to the government decision rules, (11), (12) and (13). (11), (12) and (13)
determine dH and dL, so the system determines 13 variables. An equilibrium must also
12
satisfy the condition that the outcome is consistent with rational agents. The interest
rate resulting from a certain belief about the default rate must lead to the same default
rate.
The model can contain multiple equilibria depending on the values of the endowment
distribution and the debt. Different expectations about default can lead to different
equilibria. Expectations can be self-fulfilling in the sense that expectations of default
drive up interest rates leading to default being the optimal choice for the government.
The model contains three possible equilibria; 1) no default equilibrium where agents
expect full repayment, 2) low default equilibrium where agents expect default in the low
realization of the endowment and 3) full default equilibrium where agents expect default
in both realizations of the endowment. This is discussed in further detail in section 5.2.
There is one equilibrium that is not fully determined by the model, namely the equi-
librium where investors rationally expects full repayment. Here the interest rate will equal
the risk-free rate and we are unable to determine who buys the bond, a and a∗. When
there is no risk of the government defaulting both assets are risk free and both investors
are indifferent between investing in the sovereign bond or the asset on the world market.
Since the debt obligations are in exogenous supply we know that everything will be sold,
but not who buys them. See section 5.2 for further discussion.
4.5 Parameterization
When parameterizing the model I set the deep parameters in accordance with existing
literature and new parameters to get sensible results for the default rates and interest
rates. I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion, θ, to 1, so I use log utility. The risk-
free interest rate is set to 3%, rR = 0.03 and the discount rate for both agents is set in
accordance with that rate, β = 1
1+rR
. The parameters of the loss function are chosen so
that the resulting default decisions are within reasonable limits, h = 1 and k = 0.15. All
these primary parameters stay constant throughout the thesis. The rest of the variables
are subject to change during the analysis, but unless other values are declared the following
values are the ones used. The second period endowment is normalized to one, yH = 1
for the high outcome and the low outcome is set to 0.8, yL = 0.8. The probability of the
low outcome is set to 20%, p = 0.2. The second period endowment of the foreign investor
is certain and equal to one, y∗ = 1. Government debt is set to 150% of GDP, B = 1.5.
Period one wealth is set to two for both agents, I1 = I∗1 = 2. The exogenous tax the
foreign agent has to pay in period two is 0.5, τ ∗ = 0.5.
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5 Analysis
In the previous section I developed a model that contributes to the understanding of
what happened to the ownership structure of European sovereign debt in the period from
2007 to 2011. In this section I display and explain the predictions of the model. One
main result is that a reduction in the share of foreign investors is a rational response
of expected utility maximizers when home investors must repay their government’s debt
through taxes. This is due to consumption smoothing over the different states in the
second period. Default reduces the value of bond holdings for both the foreign and
domestic investor. The domestic investor is also penalized for his government’s actions,
but is compensated by a reduction in taxes. The government will in fact only default if
the net effect to its citizens is positive. The fact that tax expenses and bond earnings are
positively correlated makes government bonds a good hedging opportunity for the home
investor. He realize that a loss on the investment will be compensated by a reduction
in taxes. This effect will affect portfolio choice as long as there is some default risk and
become stronger when risk increases. This implies that when default risk increases the
interest rate increases and the foreign share of bond holdings decreases.
Domestic investors increase their holdings of the sovereign debt when faced with de-
fault risk because the return on the debt is negatively correlated with their other income.
The fact that default usually happen when the realization of yi is low may complicate
this result. If default occurs when output is very low the correlation may be reversed
together with the predictions of the model. The model is not sensitive to this possible
complication and the bad realization of the endowment would have to be very low for the
results to change.
The analysis is conducted by changing the level of default risk. In equation (11), from
the government’s solution, we see that the default rate is decreasing in GDP and increasing
in total debt issued. Thus I change default risk by changing the income distribution and
the level of debt, that is values for yH , yL, p and B. Throughout the main part of my
analysis the focus will be on equilibria where the government defaults only in the bad
realization of the endowment, but for some combinations of parameters more than one
equilibrium may exist. These cases will be discussed in section 5.2. In section 5.1.1 to
5.1.4 I consider cases where the high outcome of GDP always results in full repayment and
the government defaults only in the low outcome. Increased default risk is thus captured
by an increased default rate in the bad outcome of GDP.
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5.1 Analysis on the foreign share for different levels of risk
In this section I focus only on the equilibrium where investors expect default in bad times
and full repayment in good times. I model the increased default risk in different ways.
First I analyze changes in the expectations about second period GDP, second I analyze
changes in both expectations and the period one realization of income, third I analyze
what the model predicts for different levels of government debt and finally I include
scenarios where the high and low outcomes remains the same, but the probability of a
low outcome increases.
5.1.1 Different expectations about GDP
In this section I consider the effects of variation in the expectations of GDP by changing
yH and keeping yL = 0.8yH . The results can be seen in figure 2, where the x-axis is the
expectation of second period GDP, the dotted line is the foreign share of holdings and the
solid line the interest rate on the bond. The x-axis here is reversed such that default risk
increase when you move right in the figure. All figures in the analysis chapter display the
outcome with the highest risk at the far right of the x-axis. With lower expected second
period endowment interest rates rise and the share of foreign holders of the sovereign bond
fall. The models explanation is that when expectations about GDP fall, the expected
default rate in case of the bad scenario increase. The increased default rate makes the
bond less attractive for both investors, so the interest rate increases. To understand why
the foreign share decrease we must understand what happens to the investors’ demand
for the bond. The foreign investor observes a decrease in expected return on the bond so
he demands higher interest rates. The domestic investor experience the same decrease in
expected return, but he knows that in case of default taxes would decrease as well. Low
repayment on the bond thus corresponds to higher values of his other disposable income.
His loss of utility is thus lower than for the foreign investor. The home investors then
take advantage of the higher interest rates to acquire more of the bond.
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Figure 2: Interest rates and foreign shares for different values of expected GDP. High values
of expected GDP leads to high shares of foreign bond holdings and low interest rates. With lower levels
of expected GDP interest rates are higher and domestic investors buy more of the bond.
5.1.2 Different period one income and expectations about GDP
The above result shows what happens if only the second period distribution changes.
In this section I let period one income for the home investor change together with the
expectation of period two income I let I1 = yH+1 and vary yH in the same way I did in the
previous section. This could be interpreted as a situation where the outcome tomorrow
is correlated with the realization of income today. As seen in figure 3 the results are
qualitatively the same, but the magnitudes are different. The effect on interest rates is
stronger than before and the effect on foreign share of bond holdings is weaker. The key to
understanding this result is related to effective demand. The home investor has a stronger
incentive to invest in the home bond than the foreign investor when the default risk is
higher. In this set-up, where income in period one and two are correlated, the strongest
incentive for home investors to purchase home bonds coincide with a low income and less
means to actually buy the bonds. So the interest rates increase more when income fall
because of the negative effect lower period one home income has on the demand for bonds.
The foreign share of bond holdings fall less because home investors increased demand for
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Figure 3: Interest rates and foreign shares for different values of period one income and
expected GDP. Compared to figure 2 interest rates respond more, and the foreign share less, to different
values of expected GDP. Lower period one income limits the home investor’s ability to buy bonds, lowering
effective demand for the bond and thus leads to higher interest rates.
home bonds in bad times are partly offset by the fact that they now have less wealth to
spend on bonds.
5.1.3 Different values of total debt
The level of total government debt also affects the default decision and gross return on
the government bond. Figure 4 shows that an increase in the home government’s debt,
B, will have the same effect on interest rates and the foreign share of bond holdings as
lower expected GDP. Higher total debt increases default risk because the gains of default
increase. High debt makes the government choose a higher default rate than with low
debt. This has the same asymmetric effect on home and foreign investors as in the two
previous cases. Both investors observe the increased risk and demand higher interest
rates, but the home investor is inclined to buy more of the bond because his total period
two income is less affected by default than the foreign investor.
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Figure 4: Interest rates and foreign shares for different values of total debt. High debt has
the same effects as low expected GDP. Default risk increases, leading to a higher interest rate and a lower
share of foreign holdings.
5.1.4 Different probabilities of low outcome
Another way to change the default risk is to change the probability of the low outcome
occurring. Figure 5 shows how the interest rate and foreign share of bonds react to
values of p from 10% to 40%. The qualitative results are the same, but in this case the
interest rate moves a lot more than the share of foreign holdings. The reason for this
is twofold. The foreign share moves less because the probability of default affects the
marginal default rate less than a change in yL. A reduction in yL has a direct effect
on the marginal default rate through the governments first order condition and indirectly
through higher interest rates in the market. The default rate increase because of the lower
endowment and because the interest rate is higher. A change in the probability of the low
outcome only has this indirect effect on the marginal default rate. Less movement in the
foreign share leads to a more responsive interest rate because an increase in the domestic
share of bond holdings contributes to dampening the default risk.
The probability of default also moves the interest rate more because it has a much
stronger effect on the expected default rate than a decrease in the low outcome. The
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Figure 5: Interest rates and foreign shares for different probabilities of a bad outcome. The
interest rates react very much in this case. The interest rate is much more responsive to this form of
increased risk because increased probability of default has a much greater impact on expected default
than a marginal increase in the default rate.
large expected default rate makes investors demand a very high interest rate. Consider
two changes to the income distribution, both having the same effect on the expected
endowment, one where we increase p and one where we decrease yL. Remember that in
this calibration of the model a high outcome always implies full repayment and a low
outcome implies default. The expected default rate is thus pdL. A lower yL will increase
the default rate in case of the low realization of the endowment. Increased probability
of the low realization will both increase the probability of default and also increase the
default rate because of the higher interest rate. With the parameterization used here a
decrease in the expected second period endowment of about 2% by increasing p leads to
an increase in the expected default rate of about 6.5 percentage points. An equal decrease
in the expected endowment brought about by a lower bad outcome leads to an increase
in the expected default rate of about 2 percentage points.
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5.2 Analysis of multiple equilibria
The discontinuity that arises when the government goes from choosing full repayment to
default leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria because of the interaction between
interest rates and the default decision. In the low default equilibrium investors believe
that the government will default if output is low. Here the interest rate is such that it is
optimal for the government to default if output is low and not default if output is high.
In the no default equilibrium investors believe in full repayment in both states. This
leads to a low interest rate which makes it optimal for the government to repay all it’s
debt in both outcomes. In the full default equilibrium the high interest rates resulting
from expectations of default in both realizations drive interest rates so high that the
government defaults even if the income realization is high.
Specific combinations of B, yH , yL and p can all lead to multiple equilibria. In the first
part of my analysis I focused on the equilibrium where investors expect default in bad
times and full repayment in good times. In the following sections I discuss the existence
of this equilibrium. I also examine for what values the other equilibria will exist. I do
this by varying yL and describe for what values the model has more than one equilibrium.
There will be an upper threshold for yL where expectations of default in bad times is
no longer consistent with an equilibrium and a lower threshold where expectations of
full repayment in good times is no longer consistent. This provides some answers to the
uniqueness and existence of equilibria in the model in addition to being the basis for an
interesting analysis on how a default situation might arise.
5.2.1 The possibility of certain repayment
In my earlier analysis I worked exclusively with the case where agents expect default in
bad times and full repayment in good times. For my discussion of the different equilibria
I include some additional notation to clarify what set of expectations led to that solution.
I include subscripts for the interest rate and foreign share denoting the different sets of
expectations; ND denotes expectations of no default, LD denotes expectations of default
in the low realization and full repayment in the high realization of the endowment and FD
denotes expectations of default in both the high and the low realization of the endowment.
I also specify where r and f are dependent on yL
Let’s first consider the case where all agents expect full repayment even if the realization
of the endowment is low. Interest rates will drop to the risk-free rate and the condition
for the government to actually repay all of its debt in the low outcome is described in
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(24). The condition on yL is sufficient because the fact that yL < yH ensures that full
repayment in the low outcome implies full repayment in the high outcome.
yL ≥ [f(1 + rR)B]
2
4kh
(24)
With expectations of full repayment we have no way of determining a and a∗ as both
investors are indifferent between the government bond and the risk-free alternative. We
are, however, sure that all of the debt will be bought, since we have an exogenous supply.
Since the foreign share, f , is arbitrary we do not have one specific threshold value for
where the equilibrium will exist. I can, however, specify a threshold value for the low
outcome dependent on f , ŷL(f), given in (25).
ŷL(f) =
[f(1 + rR)B]
2
4kh
(25)
If, for a given foreign share f , the low outcome is lower than tis threshold, yL < ŷL(f),
the government will default in the low outcome and the equilibrium with expectations of
full repayment even in bad times will not exist in this case. However, if the low outcome is
higher than the threshold, yL > ŷL(f) the government will not default at the low interest
rate and the no default equilibrium will exist.
Assume then that investors expect that the government will default in the low outcome.
Interest rates are determined in the market for sovereign debt and the condition for the
government to repay its debt is described by the standard endpoint condition from the
governments problem found in equation (12). From this condition we can find a threshold
level, yL, that is given by (26). Contrary to ŷL(f), this value is fully determined in the
model. When investors expect default we know who buys the debt and f is determined
within the model.
yL =
[f(yL)LD(1 + r(y
L)LD)B]
2
4kh
(26)
If yL < yL, an equilibrium where investors expect default under the low outcome and full
repayment under the high outcome will exist. If the threshold, yL, is higher than yL(f)
the chosen parameterization allow for both the no default equilibrium and the low default
equilibrium to exist. Both will be possible solutions to the model if we specify the low
outcome to be in the region between the two threshold values, yL(f) ≤ yL ≤ yL. Which
one prevails depend on the expectations of the agents and is not discussed here.
5.2.2 The possibility of certain default
Let us now assume that investors believe the government will default in both realizations
of the endowment. This leads to a very high interest rate and we can find threshold
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values for this to be a rational equilibrium in the same way as in the previous section. y˜L,
defined by (27) is the threshold level for the full default equilibrium to exist.
yH =
[f(y˜L)FD(1 + r(y˜
L)FD)B]
2
4kh
(27)
If yL < y˜L the government will default in the high realization of the endowment. This
also implies default in the bad realization since yL < yH and the equilibrium will exist.
Consider again the case where investors expect default in the bad outcome and full
repayment in the good outcome. It turns out that for sufficiently low yL, the associated
interest rate becomes so high that the government will default also in the high realization
of the endowment. I can now find a lower threshold for yL that means the government
will default in the high realization of the endowment even if investors expect repayment.
This will be the lower threshold for the low default equilibrium to exist. The intuition
behind this is that when the endowment in the bad outcome becomes very low investors
expect a high default rate in the state where the bad outcome is realized. This reduces
the expected return on the bond and investors demand higher interest rates. This then
changes the optimal behavior of the government. The threshold, yL, comes from the
governments default condition and is defined by by (28).
yH =
[f(yL)LD(1 + r(y
L)LD)B]
2
4kh
(28)
If the low endowment is lower than this threshold, yL < yL, expectations of default in
the bad outcome and full repayment in the good outcome are no longer rational and the
equilibrium will not exist.
5.2.3 Existence of the low default equilibrium
Figure 6 displays levels of yL and f for which each of the different sets of expectations lead
to a rational equilibrium. The figure is divided into six areas. Each area contains a box
indicating which of the possible equilibria exists in that area. As before ND denotes the
equilibrium where there is no default in either realization of the endowment, LD denotes
the equilibria where the government defaults only in the bad realization and FD denotes
the equilibrium where the government defaults in both realizations. The area below the
f̂(yL)-curve represents the area where the no default equilibrium exists. The area above
the same curve represents the area where the government will choose to default in the
bad outcome even when investors expect repayment and demand low interest rates. They
default either because of a high share of foreign investors or a low value of the realized
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Figure 6: Existence of different equilibria for different values of yL and the foreign share.
The figure is divided into six areas where the notation in the boxes denotes which equilibria will be a
possible solution for the corresponding values of the low realization of the endowment and the foreign
share.
endowment. The vertical yL-line represents the upper threshold for which expectations
of default in good times and repayment in bad times are rational. To the right of this
line the value of the low realization of outcome is such that the government will repay all
of its debt despite high interest rates resulting from expectations of default. The dotted
yL-line represent the lower threshold for which the same low default equilibrium exists.
For values of yL to the left of this line the interest rates will become high enough for
default to be the optimal choice for the government even if the realization of yi is high.
The low default equilibrium will exist in area 2) and 5).
To find values for the different threshold levels displayed in figure 6 I use the same
parameterization as in the rest of the analysis. The upper threshold for the low default
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equilibrium, yL, is found by solving the model numerically assuming agents expect full
repayment in the good outcome and default in the bad outcome and finding the value of
yL that prove their expectations wrong. I find that yL = 0.84, implying that if yL ≥ 0.84
the government will not default even if the interest rates on its bonds are high because
of expectations of default. So expectations of full repayment in the good outcome and
default in the bad outcome are only rational as long as yL < 0.84.
By the same method I find the lower threshold, yL. I solve the model with expectations
of full repayment in the good outcome and default in the bad outcome numerically and
find the value of yL that makes the government default even in the high realization of the
endowment. I find that yL = 0.73. For dH = 0, dL > 0 to be a rational solution the low
outcome must be larger than 0.73.
In the same way I find the threshold for the full default equilibrium, y˜L. Here I find
that y˜L > yH . yL is assumed to be lower than yH , so in this specification of the model,
expectations of default in both realizations of the outcome always lead to default in both
outcomes. The full default equilibrium will exist no matter what yL is used.
The threshold value for the no default equilibrium, ŷL(f), will vary with the value of
f . First I choose the value that yield the lowest possible threshold to capture all possible
cases with multiple equilibria, f = 0. This yields yL(0) = 0, with all debt held by home
investors the government would not default no matter how low the realized endowment is.
Table 3 and 4 show some combinations of yL and f where both the low default equilibrium
and the no default equilibrium will exist. The values in table 4 corresponds to the f̂(yL)-
curve in figure 6. If we assume that the foreign share is 40% any yL between 0.64 and
0.84 will yield a situation where all three equilibria exist. One where investors believe in
full repayment in both realizations and the government does in fact repay the whole debt,
one where investors believe the government will default in the bad realization and the
government defaults because of the higher interest rates demanded by the investors and
one were investors expect certain default and the government defaults in both realizations
of the endowment.
The low default equilibrium, represented in area 2) and 5) in the figure, is stable to
small changes in default level and the income distribution. The only thing that might
move the solution from this equilibrium to another equilibrium is if all investors changed
their expectations. For the same economic fundamentals a change in expectations could
move the solution from the low default equilibrium to either the no default equilibrium
or the full default equilibrium. If, for some reason, all agents suddenly stopped believing
that the government would repay in the good scenario interest rates would rise a lot and
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Foreign share f Threshold low outcome yL(f)
0.00 0.00
0.05 0.01
0.10 0.04
0.15 0.09
0.20 0.16
0.25 0.25
0.30 0.36
0.35 0.49
0.40 0.64
0.45 0.81
0.50 0.99
Table 3: Threshold levels, yL(f), for different values of f. For each level of foreign holdings, yL(f)
denotes the minimum level of the low outcome that makes full repayment possible. E.g. if the foreign
share is 35% the low outcome must be at least 0.49 for the equilibrium with no default to exist.
Low outcome yL Threshold foreign share f(yL)
0.50 0.35
0.55 0.37
0.60 0.39
0.65 0.40
0.70 0.42
0.75 0.43
0.80 0.45
0.85 0.46
0.90 0.48
0.95 0.49
1.00 0.50
Table 4: Threshold levels, f(yL), for different values of yL. For each level of the low outcome,
f(yL) denotes the maximum level of the foreign share that ensures full repayment. E.g. if the low
outcome is 0.7 the foreign share must be no higher than 42% for the equilibrium with no default to exist.
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the government would default even in the high endowment state. The same is true for
the other equilibria as well; changes in all investors’ expectations could move the solution
to one of the other existing equilibria.
These results give rise to an interesting analysis on what may cause a situation with
default risk in the first place. If all agents assume that the government will repay all of
its debt, the ownership structure of the debt is a factor in deciding if the government
actually repays their debt. With a low outcome of 0.8, default will not happen as long
as the foreign share is less than 45 %. If the foreign share exceeds 45% the government
will default and the full repayment outcome is no longer an equilibrium. What happens
exactly on the threshold level is not well described by my model, but with a foreign share
below the threshold the economy will be in a stable low-interest equilibrium and above it
will be in a stable high-interest equilibrium.
5.3 Correlation between the interest rate and the share of foreign
holders
I also check what my model would predict about the correlation between bond yields and
the foreign share of bond holders. I use the results from the different equilibria of my
earlier analysis and find correlation coefficients between them. I do this for each of the
cases in sections 5.1.1 - 5.1.4 and display the results in table 5. The correlation coefficients
in each case are calculated on 11 observations of r and f resulting from different risk
specifications.
Section Corr(r,f)
GDP (5.1.1) -0.9967
GDP and income (5.1.2) -0.9957
Debt (5.1.3) -0.9858
Probability (5.1.4) -0.9991
Table 5: Predicted correlation between interest rates and foreign shares of debt holdings in
the analysis from sections 5.1.1-5.1.4.
In table 5 we see the correlation coefficients between interest rates and the foreign
share of bond holdings from my earlier analysis. They are calculated on the same data
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created for figures 2-5. In all these cases my model predicts correlation coefficients close
to negative one. A high risk of default leads to a low share of foreign investors and high
yields. Conversely low risk of default leads to a high share of foreign investors and low
yields. There is no causation between r and f , both the foreign share of bond holdings
and the interest rate are driven by a common factor, the default risk.
6 Discussion on the model’s relevance for the situation
in Europe
In the following sections I will attempt to draw parallels between the predictions of my
model and the situation in Europe since the beginning of the millennium. All the scenarios
analyzed in the section 5 could be consistent with different countries in Europe during
and after the financial crisis. Almost all countries experienced expectations of negative
growth in GDP and some countries, notably Greece, had major increases in debt and
perceived probability of default.
6.1 Declining foreign share of investors in PIIGS-countries
Figure 7a-7e display the foreign shares and interest rates for the PIIGS countries between
2002 and 2011. The graphs use the same data presented in section 2. The pre- and
post-2007 trends established in section 2 are most apparent for Greece and Ireland, but
visible for all countries. All the countries experienced increased foreign shares from 2002
to 2007 and a decline from 2007 to 2011. The low and stable interest rates in the period
leading up to 2008 are argued to be caused, in part, by the introduction of the euro. The
same can be said about the rising foreign share of debt holdings, as the introduction of
the euro facilitated integration of financial markets and made diversification of portfolios
across borders easier. The figures also show that the timing of the trend breaks happen
about the same time as interest rates start to rise in 2008. With this in mind I argue that
increased risk may have been a factor in causing the recent decline in the foreign share.
The case of Greece is shown in figure 7d. Around 2008 Greece had high debt and
experienced expectations of low GDP which brought on concerns about default. When
concerns about risk started to rise because of an increase in debt this can be compared
to different situations in section 5.1. When debt rose my model would predict a higher
interest rate and lower share of foreign holdings. This prediction is consistent with the
data, after 2008 Greece experienced high interest rates and foreign investor sold off Greek
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debt. It could be the case that Greek investors were less afraid of buying the bond than
foreign investors because they saw potential advantages like tax cuts, or rather absence
of tax increase, if the government defaulted on its debt.
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Figure 7: Interest rates and foreign shares in the PIIGS-countries, 2002-2011
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6.2 Correlation between yield and the foreign share
Andritzky (2012) concludes that the share of foreign investors in sovereign debt is nega-
tively correlated with bond yields. That is, a high share of foreign investors is associated
with low yields. He is unable to conclude on which way the causation goes. My model
offers the possible explanation that there is no clear causation, but that both are affected
by a common driver, the risk of default. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients
from my model found in table 5 are way stronger than what we showed happened in the
data in table 2. This reflects the fact that my model ignores many factors influencing both
the interest rates and the foreign share. If we look at data from 2007-2011 the coefficients
from the model fit much better. Table 6 displays the coefficients from the crisis years. In
this time period we see much stronger negative correlation coefficients. The model gives a
clear prediction about the correlation between bond yields and the foreign shares. Look-
ing at the data, the model seems to explain the relationship better in times of crisis than
in normal times. This is not surprising as the model is constructed to analyze situations
with sovereign risk.
Country Correlation
Portugal -0.50
Italy -0.74
Ireland -0.55
Greece -0.97
Spain -0.70
Table 6: Correlation between interest rates and foreign shares of debt holdings in the PIIGS
countries between 2007 and 2011.
6.3 Contribution to the origins of the sovereign debt crisis
There were many factors both inside and outside the troubled countries contributing to
the crisis. In this section I explain how the mechanisms I propose in this thesis could have
contributed to the situation.
My model shed light on some mechanisms that may have contributed to the situation in
the European bond market. First it contains the unsurprising prediction that high debt-to-
29
GDP ratios and low expectations about future GDP results to higher risk of default. High
debt and low GDP levels impede both the government’s ability and willingness to make
good on its debt. A second, and less explored, mechanism in the model is that the increase
in foreign holdings of sovereign debt could have been a factor in increasing the default risk
when the crisis hit. In my model an increase in the foreign share alone can cause default
risk as the government only care about their own inhabitants. Third, an exogenous shock
to expectations can create actual risk. An equilibrium where all investors expect full
repayment from the Greek government may be fragile to both people’s expectations and
to the foreign share of debt holdings. These last two mechanisms were analyzed in section
5.2 and will be discussed in a European context in the following subsections.
6.3.1 A change in expectations
The model opens up the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations of default. It is possible
that any one of the PIIGS-countries could be described in a similar manner as in the model
with multiple equilibria. The situation in Greece before the crisis can be thought of as the
good equilibrium where investors believed in full repayment and the Greek interest rate
was equal to the secure German interest rate. When the financial crisis hit investors could
for some reason start questioning the ability of the Greek government to repay if GDP
took a turn for the worse. This change in expectations is a potential source of the move
from a good to a bad equilibrium where interest rates rose in sovereign debt markets. The
higher interest rates would in turn make default a credible outcome as GDP was falling
during the crisis.
This is also an interesting environment to talk about contagion effects. The reason for
shifting expectations could be default in other countries. As Greece requested the first
bailout package in April 2010 the Portuguese and Irish interest rates started to rapidly
increase. One interpretation is that the need for a bailout in Greece induced investors
in Portuguese and Irish sovereign debt to expect default or similar measures in those
countries. This change in expectations could have moved the market for those bonds
from a good equilibrium to a bad one.
6.3.2 A high share of foreign investors could have contributed
Another implication of my model is that the increase in the foreign share of bond holdings,
notably in Ireland and Greece as seen in figure 7c and 7d, could actually have contributed
to the crisis. As discussed in section 5.2 the model contains multiple equilibria for certain
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parameter values. There is a threshold level for foreign holdings that would make the good
equilibrium with full repayment become inconsistent with expectations. If foreign holdings
of Greek sovereign debt at the beginning of the millennium was below this threshold, but
increased as a result of increased diversification in the EU, it is possible that they reached
the threshold level. The fact that more foreigners owned Greek debt in 2008 than in 2002
could have made the Greek government more willing to default on their debt and when
the threshold was reached expectations about full repayment became irrational. This
could have pushed Greece from a good equilibrium to a bad one.
7 Conclusion
This thesis has introduced a model of sovereign default and debt ownership with some
features not covered to a large extent in the earlier literature. It highlights the impor-
tance of the nationality of bondholders for the default decision of a government, as the
government is more willing to default on external debt than internal. The model also
predicts changes in the ownership structure of sovereign bonds when economic fundamen-
tals change. If the default risk increases, either by lower expected GDP, higher debt or
increased probability of an economic downturn, the foreign bond holder will sell some of
their bonds to domestic buyers who are more willing to accept the risk. Domestic holders
are more willing to buy risky bonds because they realize that in the last instance they are
the ones that must repay the debt through taxes and they understand that default leads
to lower taxes. The model also shed light on the possibility of multiple equilibria and how
shocks can move the government bond market from a good equilibrium to a bad one.
The mechanisms of the model offer possible explanations for some of the events in
European sovereign debt markets in later years. It can be used to explain parts of both
the increased interest rates and the decline in foreign bond holdings when the default
risk increased. The same mechanism also offers an explanation to another, more general,
finding in the literature, namely that the foreign share and yield differentials are nega-
tively correlated. The model indicates that the sovereign bond crises could have been
sparked by an exogenous shift in expectations or an increase in foreign holdings making
the government more willing to default.
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A Matlab code
Appendix A.2-A.5 contains the Matlab codes i used to solve the model. Appendix A.1
contains a short explanation of the code.
A.1 Explanation of the code
Figure 8: How the code runs
I use Matlab’s fsolve command to numerically solve the model. fsolve cannot handle
the "if"s from the governments optimality condition so I need solutions for all sets of
expectations. The standard assumption is that the government will default in bad times
and repay in good times. The system in this case is box a) in figure 8. If the government
repays all its debt in both scenarios the solution is that the interest rate is equal to the
risk free rate. If parameters or the income distribution is set so that the government will
default even in bad times we must enter a new system with investor expecting default
in both scenarios, box b). If this raises interest rates high enough to make it optimal
for the government to default on all its debt in the bad scenario we need to update the
expectations once more, box c). Once a consistent solution is found I display the output.
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A.2 Main code
clear all
clc
%% Declare parameters
global pd B rr beta aa h in1 in1f yl yh yf tauf theta shock
B = 1.5; % Level of debt
rr = 0.03; % Risk-free interest rate
beta = 1/(1+rr); % Discount factor
in1 = 2; % Domestic period 1 wealth
in1f = 2; % Foreign period 1 wealth
tauf = 0.5; % Foreign tax rate
theta = 1; % Coefficient of relative risk aversion
aa = 0.15; % Fixed cost of default
h = 1; % Variable cost of default parameter
%% Distribution of second period endowment
% pd = probability of yl, (1-pd) = probability of yh
pd = 0.2; % Probability of low endowment
shock = 0.8; % Relative size of low endowment
yh = 1; % High outcome endowment
yl = shock*yh; % Low outcome endowment
yf = 1; % Foreign endowment
%% Model - normal expectations
% This version assumes that investors expect default in the bad outcome
% and not in the good outcome.
x0 = [1 , 1 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.15 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.4, 0];
options = optimoptions('fsolve','display','off'); % Option to display output
[z,fval,exitflag] = fsolve(@normalsig,x0,options); % Call solver
%% Output
c1 = z(1); % Domestic period one consumption
c1f = z(2); % Foreign period one consumption
a = z(3); % Domestic bond holdings
ar = z(4); % Domestic risk-free holdings
af = z(5); % Foreign bond holdings
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arf = z(6); % Foreign risk-free holdings
r = z(7); % Interest rate on bonds
c2h = z(8); % Domestic period two consumption in high endowment
c2l = z(9); % Domestic period two consumption in low endowment
c2fh = z(10); % Foreign period two consumption in high endowment
c2fl = z(11); % Foreign period two consumption in low endowment
d = z(12); % Default rate in low endowment state
dh = z(13); % Default rate in high endowment state
b = a/B; % Domestic share of bond holding
%% Test section
% Tests for the existence of equilibrium
% To ensure the solution found is actually an equilibrium I need to
% check it against the expectations assumed in the solver.
% Test that yh leads to zero default
if yh > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
zerodefaultflag = 1;
else zerodefaultflag = 0;
end
% Test if yl actually leads to default
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
lowdefaultflag = 0;
else lowdefaultflag = 1;
end
% Test that d=1 is not the solution
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)/(2*h)
fulldefaultflag = 1;
else fulldefaultflag = 0;
end
if zerodefaultflag < 0.5 % If expectations of full repayment fails
%% Model - expectations of certain default
x0 = [1 , 1 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.15 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.4, 0];
options = optimoptions('fsolve','display','off'); % Option to display output
[z,fval,exitflag] = fsolve(@defdefsig,x0,options); % Call solver
c1 = z(1);
c1f = z(2);
a = z(3);
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ar = z(4);
af = z(5);
arf = z(6);
r = z(7);
c2h = z(8);
c2l = z(9);
c2fh = z(10);
c2fl = z(11);
d = z(12);
dh = z(13);
b = a/B;
%% Test section
% Tests for the existence of equilibrium
% To ensure the solution found is actually an equilibrium I need to
% check it against the expectations assumed in the solver.
% Test that yh leads to zero default
if yh > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
zerodefaultflag = 1;
else zerodefaultflag = 0;
end
% Test if yl actually leads to default
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
lowdefaultflag = 0;
else lowdefaultflag = 1;
end
% Test that d=1 is not the solution
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)/(2*h)
fulldefaultflag = 1;
else fulldefaultflag = 0;
end
%%
if fulldefaultflag < 0.5 % If partial default fails
%% Model - expectations of certain default with full default in the
% low outcome
x0 = [1 , 1 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.15 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 0.5 , 1, 0.4];
options = optimoptions('fsolve','display','off'); % Option to display output
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[z,fval,exitflag] = fsolve(@def1defsig,x0,options); % Call solver
c1 = z(1);
c1f = z(2);
a = z(3);
ar = z(4);
af = z(5);
arf = z(6);
r = z(7);
c2h = z(8);
c2l = z(9);
c2fh = z(10);
c2fl = z(11);
d = z(12);
dh = z(13);
b = a/B;
%% Test section
% Tests for the existence of equilibrium
% To ensure the solution found is actually an equilibrium I need to
% check it against the expectations assumed in the solver.
% Test that yh leads to zero default
if yh > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
zerodefaultflag = 1;
else zerodefaultflag = 0;
end
% Test if yl actually leads to default
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)^2/(4*aa*h)
lowdefaultflag = 0;
else lowdefaultflag = 1;
end
% Test that d=1 is not the solution
if yl > ((1-b)*(1+r)*B)/(2*h)
fulldefaultflag = 1;
else fulldefaultflag = 0;
end
%% Output in full default outcome
r
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f = af/B
d
dh
else
%% Output in certain default outcome
r
f = af/B
d
dh
end
elseif lowdefaultflag < 0.5 % If the government will not default in
%% Output with certain repayment % any state
r = 0.03 % the interest rate drop to the risk free rate
% and ownership is undetermined.
else
%% Output in normal default outcome
r
f = af/B
d
dh
end
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A.3 System with normal default
%% System with normal default expectations
% Filnename: normalsig.m
function G = twostate(x)
global pd B rr beta aa h in1 in1f yl yh yf tauf theta
G(1) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(8)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(9)^(theta)));
G(2) = 1/(1+rr) - beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)/x(8)^(theta))+((pd)/x(9)^(theta)));
G(3) = x(1) + x(3) + x(4) - in1;
G(4) = -x(8) + yh - (1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*B + (1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(3) + (1+rr)*x(4);
G(5) = -x(9)+yl-(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*B+(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(3)+(1+rr)*x(4)-aa-h*(x(12))^2*yl;
G(6) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(10)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(11)^(theta)));
G(7) = 1/(1+rr)-beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)/x(10)^(theta))+((pd)/x(11)^(theta)));
G(8) = x(2) + x(5) + x(6) - in1f;
G(9) = -x(10) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(10) = -x(11) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(11) = x(3) + x(5) - B;
G(12) = - x(12) + (((1-(x(3)/B))*(1+x(7))*B)/(2*h*yl));
G(13) = - x(13);
% x(1) = c1
% x(2) = c1f
% x(3) = a
% x(4) = ar
% x(5) = af
% x(6) = arf
% x(7) = r
% x(8) = c2h
% x(9) = c2l
% x(10) = c2fh
% x(11) = c2fl
% x(12) = dl
% x(13) = dh
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A.4 System with certain default
%% System with expectations of default in both scenarios
% Filename: defdefsig.m
function G = twostate(x)
global pd B rr beta aa h in1 in1f yl yh yf tauf theta
G(1) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(8)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(9)^(theta)));
G(2) = 1/(1+rr) - beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)/x(8)^(theta))+((pd)/x(9)^(theta)));
G(3) = x(1) + x(3) + x(4) - in1;
G(4) = -x(8)+yh-(1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*B+(1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(3)+(1+rr)*x(4)-aa-h*(x(13))^2*yh;
G(5) = -x(9)+yl-(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*B+(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(3)+(1+rr)*x(4)-aa-h*(x(12))^2*yl;
G(6) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(10)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(11)^(theta)));
G(7) = 1/(1+rr) - beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)/x(10)^(theta))+((pd)/x(11)^(theta)));
G(8) = x(2) + x(5) + x(6) - in1f;
G(9) = -x(10) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(10) = -x(11) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(11) = x(3) + x(5) - B;
G(12) = - x(12) + (((1-(x(3)/B))*(1+x(7))*B)/(2*h*yl));
G(13) = - x(13) + (((1-(x(3)/B))*(1+x(7))*B)/(2*h*yh));
% x(1) = c1
% x(2) = c1f
% x(3) = a
% x(4) = ar
% x(5) = af
% x(6) = arf
% x(7) = r
% x(8) = c2h
% x(9) = c2l
% x(10) = c2fh
% x(11) = c2fl
% x(12) = dl
% x(13) = dh
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A.5 System with full default in bad times
%% System with expectation of full default in bad scenario
% Filename: def1defsig.m
function G = twostate(x)
global pd B rr beta aa h in1 in1f yl yh yf tauf theta
G(1) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(8)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(9)^(theta)));
G(2) = 1/(1+rr) - beta*x(1)*(((1-pd)/x(8)^(theta))+((pd)/x(9)^(theta)));
G(3) = x(1) + x(3) + x(4) - in1;
G(4) = -x(8)+yh-(1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*B+(1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(3)+(1+rr)*x(4)-aa-h*(x(13))^2*yh;
G(5) = -x(9)+yl-(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*B+(1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(3)+(1+rr)*x(4)-aa-h*(x(12))^2*yl;
G(6) = 1/(1+x(7))-beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)*(1-x(13))/x(10)^(theta))+(pd*(1-x(12))/x(11)^(theta)));
G(7) = 1/(1+rr) - beta*x(2)*(((1-pd)/x(10)^(theta))+((pd)/x(11)^(theta)));
G(8) = x(2) + x(5) + x(6) - in1f;
G(9) = -x(10) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(13))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(10) = -x(11) + yf - tauf + (1+x(7))*(1-x(12))*x(5) + (1+rr)*x(6);
G(11) = x(3) + x(5) - B;
G(12) = - x(12) + 1;
G(13) = - x(13) + (((1-(x(3)/B))*(1+x(7))*B)/(2*h*yh));
% x(1) = c1
% x(2) = c1f
% x(3) = a
% x(4) = ar
% x(5) = af
% x(6) = arf
% x(7) = r
% x(8) = c2h
% x(9) = c2l
% x(10) = c2fh
% x(11) = c2fl
% x(12) = dl
% x(13) = dh
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